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GOOD FAITH:
A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD DOCTRINE
by
ROBERT S. ADLER*
RICHARD A. MANN**
The importance and ubiquity of contracts cannot be overstated. It is
indeed the rare individual who does not enter into or perform contracts on a
daily basis. Moreover, every business enterprise unavoidably must enter into
contracts with its employees, its suppliers of goods and services, and its cus-
tomers in order to conduct its business operations.
Given the innumerable contractual transactions, it is inevitable that dis-
putes would arise from contracts. The law's approach to policing the contrac-
tual relationship has been starkly dichotomous: those contracting parties who
are considered to deal at arm's length receive a substantially lower level of
protection than those who, because of a special relationship (fiduciary or
confidential) between them, are not deemed to deal at arm's length. It is our
view that many contracting parties enter into relationships (strategic alliances)
that do not fall at these poles but rather fall somewhere in between. We en-
dorse the law's dichotomous treatment as a reasonably effective, general set
of default provisions for contracting parties, but we observe that, as default
provisions, they may be modified to meet the particular needs of specific
alliances. In short, we conclude that there are numerous alliances that, while
not fully fiduciary nor fully confidential, are really not fully arm's length.' In
addition, there are many alliances in which one or both of the parties would
prefer that their contract not be treated as arm's length, but rather as one re-
quiring some higher standard of conduct.2 Nonetheless, for the most part,
these alliances are governed by the default provisions applicable to arm's
length transactions because the parties have not turned to contractual provi-
sions imposing higher standards.
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill; A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1966; J.D., University of Michigan,
1969.
** Professor of Legal Studies, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina-
Chapel Hill; B.S., University of North Carolina, 1964; J.D., Yale University, 1973.
1. For example, this category may include some of the following types of contracts: output
and requirements contracts, exclusive dealing contracts, and credit transactions.
2. For example, a higher standard of conduct might be desired where one of the parties has
considerably less bargaining power or is at a severe disadvantage regarding access to material
information about the transaction.
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It is our contention that many of these alliances would be well served by
the parties' opting out of the automatic provisions of arm's length transactions
by agreeing to higher standards. In other words, strategic alliances should
consider the benefits of "shortening the arm's-lengthedness" of their contrac-
tual relationship. Moreover, we consider the doctrine of good faith to be well
suited to serve as the mechanism to accomplish this objective.
In this article we sketch the basic contours of the contractual policing
devices that apply to special relationships and to arm's length transactions.
We then explicate in greater detail the duty of good faith under general con-
tract law and the Uniform Commercial Code. Finally, we explore some strat-
egies for shortening arm's length transactions through consensual extensions
of the duty of good faith.
TRADITIONAL CONTRACT LAW PROTECTIONS
As mentioned, contractual dealings give rise to the possibility that dis-
putes will occur. Many contract disputes are brought about by misconduct of
one or both of the parties. Contractual misconduct typically fits into two
patterns: (1) conduct precluding the voluntary or knowing assent of a party to
the contract or (2) the unreliability of the other party to the contract. Examples
of the first include duress and fraud. Unreliability ranges from lack of dili-
gence to willful breach. In addition, contractual disputes may arise from the
unpredictability of the future. Unpredictability includes unforeseen events
that change the economics of performance.
The law provides a number of "policing devices" to protect parties to a
contract from misconduct. The level of protection and which devices are
available depend upon three factors (in order of importance): the legal rela-
tionship between the parties, the stage of the contract in which the misconduct
occurs, and the applicable law.
Contracts are primarily governed by state common law, except for sales
of goods if the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code) has specifically
displaced the common law.' But where general contract law has not been
specifically modified by the Code, the common law of contracts continues to
apply to sales of goods transactions.4 Except for unconscionability and good
faith, the Code has no specific provisions directly bearing on the policing
devices we consider in this article.' Accordingly, the predominant determi-
3. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1990).
4. Id. Comment 1 of § 1-103 provides in part: "[T]his section indicates the continued
applicability to commercial transactions of all supplemental bodies except insofar as they are
explicitly displaced by this Act ...... Id. at cmt.1.
5. Section 1-103 states in relevant part: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
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nants of what protection is available to contracting parties are the relationship
between the parties and the stage of the contract.
6
Special Relationships Between Parties
The parties to a contract are deemed not at arm's length when they have
a special relationship, either confidential or fiduciary. In such relationships
the law imposes additional duties beyond those required in an arm's length
transaction upon one of the parties resulting in "heightened" protection for the
other party. In these relationships the law establishes a duty of full disclosure,
utmost good faith, and fair dealing.7
Confidential Relationship
A confidential relationship involves a dependent party who justifiably
trusts the dominant party, relies on his judgment, and assumes that the domi-
nant party will act in the dependent party's best interest.8 Confidential rela-
tionships include guardian-ward, trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal,
spouses, parent-child, attorney-client, physician-patient, and clergy-parish-
ioner.9 In addition, some types of contracts create in themselves a confiden-
tial relation requiring the utmost good faith and full disclosure. Examples
include some suretyship and guaranty contracts, 0 and insurance contracts.II
Where there is a confidential relationship, the law also forbids undue
this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validation or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."
Id. (emphasis added).
6. The legal protections discussed in this section of the article principally apply to the
formation of contracts. Nevertheless, most of them can also apply to the performance and
enforcement stage, although this occurs less frequently. As will be discussed later, good faith
does not apply to the formation stage of arm's length transactions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
7. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 738
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON]. See DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 10.4 (1973) (for
discussion on the abuse of confidential relationships).
8. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.3, at 676-78; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(1)
(1979).
9. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.3 at 677; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177, cmt.
a (1979); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 9-10, at 353 (3d ed.
1987).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 169 cmt. c (1979); LAURENCE P. SIMPSON,
SURETYSHIP 86-93 (1950); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-20, at 369; KEETON,
supra note 7, § 106, at 739.
11. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 5.8 (1988).
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influence which is the unfair persuasion of a person by a party in a dominant
position based upon a confidential relationship.12 The law carefully scruti-
nizes contracts between those in a relationship of trust and confidence that is
likely to permit one party to take unfair advantage of the dependent party. 3
Factors taken into account by the courts include the unfairness of the result-
ing contract, the unavailability of independent advice, and the vulnerability
of the victim. 4 A transaction induced by undue influence is voidable by the
dependent party.' 5
Fiduciary Relationship
A fiduciary relationship is a relationship of trust and confidence in which
one of the parties (the fiduciary) owes to the other party (the beneficiary)
a duty of utmost loyalty and good faith. 6 The fiduciary duty is even more
stringent than the duty owed in confidential relations. 7 The fiduciary duty
is owed by an agent to his principal and by an employee to his employer. 8
It is also owed by a trustee to a beneficiary of a trust, 9 by an officer or
director of a corporation to the corporation and its shareholders, 20 a partner to
the partnership, 2' by joint venturers, 22 and by a lawyer to his clients. 23
A fiduciary may not deal at arm's length. A fiduciary owes a duty to
make full disclosure of all relevant facts that the fiduciary knows or should
12. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, §§ 9-10 & 9-11; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 177 (1979).
13. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-10.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. b (1979).
15. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-12; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 177(2) (1979).
16. See DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.4, at 680-81.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173 cmt. a (1979). Note that all fiduciary
relationships are also confidential relationships but that not all confidential relationships are
fiduciary relationships.
18. See HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP
§ 4 (2d ed. 1990); See also WARREN A. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 3 (1964); W. EDWARD
SELL, AGENCY, § 131 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2 & 13 (1957).
19. See GEORGE G. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 95 (6th ed. 1987) (for a general discussion on the
fiduciary duty of a trustee).
20. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 235 (3d ed.
1983) (for general discussion on fiduciary duties).
21. U.P.A. § 21 (1914); REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 18, § 188.
22. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra
note 18, § 266.
23. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.4, at 681.
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know when entering into a transaction with the beneficiary. 4 Moreover, the
beneficiary must understand fully his or her legal rights. 25 A fiduciary must
deal fairly and in good faith with the beneficiary. As Judge (later Justice)
Cardozo said "[miany forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee [fiduciary] is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. 26
Moreover, a fiduciary must act solely in the interest of the beneficiary,
not in his or her own interest or in the interest of a third party.27 The fiduciary's
loyalty must be undivided, and his or her actions must be devoted exclusively
to represent and promote the interests of the beneficiary.28 A fiduciary cannot
compete with the beneficiary or act on behalf of a competitor.29 A fiduciary
may not use or disclose confidential information obtained in the course of the
relationship for his or her own benefit or contrary to the interest of the ben-
eficiary.30 A fiduciary may not profit secretly from the relationship with the
beneficiary. 31
Arm's Length Transactions
An arm's length transaction is one in which the parties owe each other
no special duties and each is acting in his or her own self interest.32 Where the
parties deal at arm's length, they are subject to the ordinary legal protections
against misconduct. In most business or market transactions, the parties deal
at arm's length and are thus subject only to "the morals of the market place."
Misconduct prohibited in arm's length transactions includes duress,
fraud, misrepresentation, unilateral mistake, and unconscionability. In con-
trast to transactions between parties in a special relationship, in an arm's
length transaction an affirmative duty of disclosure is not imposed 33 and
fairness is policed only at the margin.
24. KEETON, supra note 7, § 106, at 739; BOGERT, supra note 19, §§ 87 & 96; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173 (1979);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)(1981).
25. BOGERT, supra note 19, § 96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173(b)(1979).
26. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. at 546.
27. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.4, at 681; BOGERT, supra note 19, § 95.
28. BOGERT, supra note 19, § 95.
29. See DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.4 (noting duties of fiduciaries).
30. Id.
31. Id.; BOGERT, supra note 19, § 95.
32. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.4 at 680.
33. Id. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-20 at 367. See also KEETON, supra
note 7, § 106, at 737.
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Duress
"Duress is a form of coercion."'34 Because a person should not be held to an
agreement into which he has not entered voluntarily, the law will not enforce
any contract induced by duress.3" In general, duress is any wrongful act or
threat that overcomes the free will of a party.36 But the misconduct must go
beyond hard bargaining to constitute duress;37 there must be the use of im-
proper threats or acts, including economic and social coercion, to compel a
person to enter into a contract.3 The threat may be explicit or may be inferred
from words or conduct,39 but in either case it must leave the victim with no
reasonable alternative. a Duress makes the contract voidable at the option of
the coerced party."
Fraud
Whereas duress prevents assent to a contract from being voluntarily
given, fraud prevents assent from being knowingly given. Fraud, also called
deceit, is an intentional misrepresentation of material fact by one party to the
other party, who consents to enter into a contract in justifiable reliance on the
misrepresentation a.4 Fraud renders the contract voidable by the defrauded
party, 3 who also has the alternate remedy of affirming the contract and recov-
ering damages.14 The requisite elements of fraud are: (1) a false representa-
34. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.2 at 655.
35. Id. at 656; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979); CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-8, at 349.
36. See DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.2, at 655-58; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9,
§ 9-2, at 337.
37. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-3, at 341; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. f (1979).
38. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, §§ 9-2, 9-3 & 9-7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 176 (1979); See DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.2, at 660-70 (necessity of wrongful
act for duress to be established).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. a (1979); DOBBS, supra note 7, §
10.2, at 660.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. b (1979); DOBBS, supra note 7, §
10.2, at 658.
41. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-8, at 349; DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.2, at
656; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 525 (1981).
43. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, §§ 9-13 & 9-23; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1979).
44. KEETON, supra note 7, § 110; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-23, at 373-77;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 1981.
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tion (2) of a fact (3) that is material and (4) made with knowledge of its fal-
sity and the intention to deceive and (5) which representation is justifiably
relied on.45
A false representation "is an assertion that is not in accord with the
facts. ' 46 A misrepresentation may be made through a positive statement,
through conduct that misleads, or by concealment of a fact the other party
would otherwise have learned.47 Moreover, a statement of misleading half-
truth is considered the equivalent of a false representation.48
As a general rule, silence or nondisclosure alone does not amount to
fraud when the parties deal at arm's length.49 In most business or market trans-
actions, the parties deal at arm's length and generally have no obligation to tell
the other party everything they know about the subject of the contract. Thus,
it is not fraud when a buyer possesses advantageous information about the
seller's property, information of which the buyer knows the seller to be igno-
rant, yet does not disclose such information to the seller.
50
Although nondisclosure usually does not constitute misrepresentation,
in certain situations it does.5 ' For example, a person may have a duty of
disclosure because of prior representations innocently made before entering
into the contract, which the person subsequently discovers to be untrue.
52
In addition, the federal securities statutes, 3 as well as a number of other
statutes,54 impose an affirmative obligation to disclose information in certain
types of transactions. Another instance of a duty to disclose arises when
45. KEETON, supra note 7, §§ 107-09.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (1979).
47. KEETON, supra note 7, § 106, at 737; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-20, at
367; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 160 (1979).
48. KEETON, supra note 7, § 106, at 738; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-20, at
367-68; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 159 cmt. b (1979).
49. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.4, at 680; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-20, at
367.
50. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.4, at 680.
51. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-20, at 367-70; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 161 (1979).
52. KEETON, supra note 7, § 106, at 738; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c)
(1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(a) cmt. c (1979).
53. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48
Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988)). See generally THOMAS
L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed. 1990).
54. See, e.g., Truth-in-Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1982)); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act
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(1) a person fails to disclose a fact known to him; (2) "he knows that the dis-
closure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic as-
sumption on which that party is making the contract"; and (3) "non-disclosure
of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with rea-
sonable standards of fair dealing." 11
Another basic element of fraud is that the misrepresentation concern a
material fact. 6 A fact is an event that actually took place or a thing that actu-
ally exists.5 Actionable fraud can rarely be based upon what is merely a state-
ment of opinion 8. 5 A representation is one of opinion if it expresses only the
uncertain, non-expert belief of the representer as to the existence of a fact or
his judgment as to quality, value, authenticity, or other matters of judgment.5 9
Also to be distinguished from a representation of fact is a prediction of
the future. Predictions are similar to opinions, as no one can know with cer-
tainty what will happen in the future, and normally predictions are not re-
garded as factual statements.6" Likewise, promissory statements ordinarily do
not constitute a basis of fraud, as a breach of promise does not necessarily
indicate that the promise was fraudulently made. 61 However, a promise that
the promisor, at the time of making, had no intention of keeping is a misrep-
resentation of fact.
62
In addition to the requirement that a misrepresentation be one of fact,
it must also be material. 63 A misrepresentation is material if (1) it would
be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent or (2) the
maker of the misrepresentation knows that it would be likely to induce the
(1LSFDA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1982).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1981).
56. KEETON, supra note 7, § 108, at 753-54.
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A (1981).
58. KEETON, supra note 7, § 109; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-17, at 361-63.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 168(1) (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 538A & cmt. b (1981); See KEETON, supra note 7, § 109, at 755-58 (for representations
based on opinion).
60. KEETON, supra note 7, § 109, at 762.
61. Id. at 762-65.
62. Id.; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-19, at 365-66; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 530 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 171 cmt. b (1979).
63. KEETON, supra note 7, § 108, at 753-54; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(1)
(1981). In contrast, the Restatement of Contracts provides that a contract justifiably induced
by a misrepresentation is voidable if the misrepresentation is either fraudulent or material.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1979). Thus, under the Restatement of
Contracts a fraudulent misrepresentation does not have to be material for the recipient to
obtain rescission, but under the Restatement of Torts it must be material if the recipient is to
[Vol. 28:1
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recipient to do so.64
For a misrepresentation to be fraudulent it must have been known by the
one making it to be false65 and must have been made with an intent to de-
ceive.66 This element of fraud is known as scienter.67 Knowledge of falsity can
consist of (a) actual knowledge,68 (b) lack of belief in the statement's truth-
fulness, 69 or (c) reckless indifference as to its truthfulness."
A person is not entitled to relief unless he has justifiably relied on the
misrepresentation. 7 If the complaining party's decision was in no way influ-
enced by the misrepresentation, he or she has not been deceived because he
or she did not rely. Justifiable reliance requires that the misrepresentation
contribute substantially to the misled party's decision to enter into the con-
tract. 72 Thus, if the complaining party knew (or it was obvious) that the rep-
resentation of the defendant was untrue, but the party nevertheless entered
into the contract, he has not justifiably relied. 73
Nonfraudulent Misrepresentation
Nonfraudulent misrepresentation - which includes both negligent and
innocent misrepresentation - is a material, false statement that induces an-
other to rely justifiably but is made without scienter. Negligent misrepresen-
tation is a false statement that is made without due care in ascertaining its
truthfulness.74 Innocent misrepresentation is a false representation made
recover damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1981).
64. KEETON, supra note 7, § 108, at 753-54; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 538(2) (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) cmt. c (1979).
65. KEETON, supra note 7, § 107, at 741.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 741-45; DOBBS, supra note 7, § 9.2, at 608; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 162 cmt. b (1979).
68. KEETON, supra note 7, § 107, at 741; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(1) (1979).
69. KEETON, supra note 7, § 107, at 741-42; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 162(1) (1979).
70. KEETON, supra note 7, § 107, at 741-42.
71. KEETON, supra note 7, § 108, at 749-53; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 537 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1979).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 167 (1979).
73. KEETON, supra note 7, § 108, at 750; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541 (1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 172 cmt. b (1979).
74. KEETON, supra note 7, § 107, at 745-48. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 528 & 552 (1981).
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without knowledge of its falsity but with due care.7 5 To obtain relief for
nonfraudulent misrepresentation, all of the other elements of fraud must be
present including materiality. 76 The remedies that may be available for
nonfraudulent misrepresentation are rescission or damages.77
Unilateral Mistake
A mistake is a belief that is not in accord with the facts.78 Unilateral
mistake occurs when only one of the parties is mistaken. 79 Courts have been
hesitant to grant relief for unilateral mistake even though it relates to a basic
assumption on which the party entered into the contract and has a material
effect on the agreed exchange. 80 Nevertheless, relief will be granted where the
nonmistaken party knows, or reasonably should know, that such a material
mistake has been made or where the mistake was caused by the fault of the
nonmistaken party. 81
Unconscionability
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that every contract for the sale
of goods may be scrutinized by the court to determine whether in its commer-
cial setting, purpose, and effect it is unconscionable.82 The court may refuse
to enforce an unconscionable contract or any part of the contract it finds to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made.83 The Restatement has a
similar provision. 84 Neither the Code nor the Restatement defines the word
unconscionable. 85
75. KEETON, supra note 7, § 107, at 748-49. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552C (1981) (noting the liability of innocent misrepresentations in commercial
contexts).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1979).
77. KEETON, supra note 7, §§ 107 & 110; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-23, at
373; DOBBS, supra note 7, § 9.2, at 608-10; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 552, 552B
& 552C (1981).
78. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 11.2, at 718.
79. Id. § 11.4, at 736-37.
80. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-27; DOBBS, supra note 7, § 11.4, at 637.
81. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-27; DOBBS, supra note 7, § 11.4.
82. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1992). Article 2A of the U.C.C., which applies to leases of goods, has
a comparable provision. U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1992).
83. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1992); 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-3, at 201-02 (3d ed. 1988).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
85. 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 83, § 4-3, at 203; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note
9, § 9-38, at 402.
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The doctrine of unconscionability attempts to prevent oppression and
unfair surprise, but not to relieve a party from a bad bargain.86 The basic test
is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the com-
mercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of
the making of the contract.8
7
The doctrine of unconscionability has evolved through its application by
the courts to include both procedural and substantive unconscionability.88 In
most cases in which relief for unconscionability has been granted, however,
elements of both types of unconscionability have been present.89 Procedural
unconscionability concerns how a term became a part of the contract and
looks for the presence of "bargaining naughtiness." 90 In other words, was
unconscionable conduct used to induce the contract?9' Substantive
unconscionability deals with the actual terms of a contract and excludes op-
pressive or grossly unfair provisions such as exorbitant prices, unfair exclu-
sions or limitations of contractual remedies, or provisions which deprive one
party of the benefits of the agreement.
92
GOOD FAITH
As discussed in the preceding section, parties dealing at arm's length
must refrain from duress, fraud, misrepresentation, and unconscionability,
and must not exploit a unilateral mistake by the other party. Unlike special
relationships, in arm's length transactions full disclosure, good faith, and fair
dealing are not imposed by the ordinary policing devices. To be sure, gross
unfairness does invoke the protection of the doctrine of unconscionability but
this doctrine does not address less-than-extreme forms of unfairness. There
is, however, a duty that to some extent deals with honesty and fairness in
arm's length contracts - the obligation of good faith.
86. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1992).
87. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1979).
88. ARTHUR A. LEFF, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487-88 (1967); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, §§ 9-37, 9-40;
DOBBS, supra note 7, § 10.7, at 710-11.
89. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 9-40; 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 83,
§ 4-7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1979).
90. LEFF, supra note 88, at 487; See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 83, § 4-3 (discussing
procedural unconscionability). The Code's article dealing with leases of goods explicitly
recognizes procedural unconscionability in the case of consumer leases. U.C.C. § 2A-108(2)
(1992).
91. Cf. U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) (1992).
92. LEFF, supra note 88, at 509-12; 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 83, §§ 4-4 to 4-6.
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Duty of Good Faith
Good faith can be traced back to Roman law93 and a number of civil law
countries require good faith in contracts.94 During the nineteenth century, the
American common law was reluctant to recognize explicitly any "generalized
duty to act in good faith." 95 American law now imposes a duty of good faith
across a broad spectrum of commercial transactions. 96 For example, it applies
to commercial paper and other negotiable instruments, bank deposits and
collections, electronic funds transfers (wire transfers), letters of credit, bulk
transfers, documents of title, investment securities, and secured transactions. 7
In this article we are concerned with the doctrine's application to contracts
including sales and leases of goods.
The Uniform Commercial Code,98 the Restatement of Contracts,99 and a
majority of the states 00 recognize the duty to perform a contract in good faith.
The Uniform Commercial Code states that "Every contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."10'
The Restatement provides "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.' 0 °2
Neither the Code nor the Restatement provisions deal with good faith in the
negotiation and formation of a contract.10 3 Rather, they apply to the perfor-
mance and enforcement of contracts.
The duty of good faith may not be disclaimed by the parties. 104 They
may, however, by agreement determine the standards by which the perfor-
93. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 669-70 (1963).
94. B. J. REITER, Good Faith in Contracts, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 705, 708 (1983).
95. ERIC M. HOLMES, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith
Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 384 (1978).
96. FARNSWORTH, supra note 93, at 667; RUSSELL A. EISENBERG, Good Faith Under the
Uniform Commercial Code - A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REV.I, 1 n.1
(1971).
97. E.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 4-406, 4A-105, 5-114, 6-107, 7-206, 8-406 & 9-504 (1992).
98. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1992).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
100. STEVEN J. BURTON, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369 & n.1 (1980).
101. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1992).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
103. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, The General Duty of Good Faith. It's Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 824 n. 61 (1982). "This Section, like Uniform
Commercial Code § 1-203, does not deal with good faith in the formation of a contract."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1979).
104. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1992).
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mance of this obligation is to be measured if the standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.'05
Definition
The UCC defines good faith generally to be "honesty in fact in the con-
duct or transaction concerned."'0 6 This definition applies a subjective stan-
dard: the reasonableness of a person's belief is irrelevant to good faith. 107
Thus, under the subjective test if a person has a "pure heart and an empty
head," she is acting in good faith.'0 8
In the case of sales or leases of goods by a merchant (a person or entity
that deals in goods of the kind involved in the contract'0 9) a more rigorous
standard of good faith applies. Good faith in these transactions means not only
honesty in fact but also the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade. 10 This definition includes both the subjective and
the objective tests. 1"
The Restatement goes beyond the Code by imposing a duty of good faith
and fair dealing - which includes both the subjective and objective tests -
on all parties not just merchants." 2 When the test of good faith involves the
objective standard of fair dealing the courts can police against subterfuges and
evasions even though the party engaging in the challenged conduct believed
it to be proper." 3
In applying the obligation of good faith courts have recognized that the
concept of good faith is broad, nebulous, and variable. 14 As the comments to
the Restatement observe, good faith is used in a variety of contexts and its
meaning varies somewhat with the context.'15 The comments further explain
that good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithful-
105. Id.
106. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1992).
107. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 11-38, at 509-10; 1 RONALD A. ANDERSON,
ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201:84 (3d ed. rev. 1992).
108. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 11-38, at 509-10; ANDERSON, supra note 107,
§ 1-201:96.
109. U.C.C. § 2-104 (1992).
110. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1992).
111. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 11-38, at 510; ANDERSON, supra note 107,
§ 1-201:85.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). See SUMMERS, supra note
103, at 824-25.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1979).
114. EISENBERG, supra note 96, at 3-4.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979).
Summer, 1994]
13
Adler and Mann: Good Faith: A New Look At An Old Doctrine
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995
AKRON LAW REVIEW
ness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expec-
tations of the other party." 6 Moreover, bad faith may be overt or may consist
of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty." 17
In an extremely influential article, Professor Summers concluded that
good faith is an "excluder."' 8 He maintained that "[i]t is a phrase without
general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves instead to exclude a wide
range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith." 1 9 The Restatement has endorsed
this approach,12 0 stating that good faith excludes a variety of conduct charac-
terized as "bad faith" because they violate community standards of decency,
fairness, or reasonableness.'12
Thus, the obligation of good faith and fair dealing has amorphous pro-
portions and varies from context to context.12 2 Accordingly, we will examine
this duty in the context of the most commonly occurring situations that arise
in the performance and enforcement of contracts.
Good Faith in Contract Performance
In applying the obligation of good faith to the performance of contracts,
the courts have identified a set of behaviors as bad faith, including evasion of
the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering
of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference
with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance.
123
116. Id.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1979).
118. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 262 (1968).
119. Id. at 201-02
120. STEVEN J. BURTON, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to
Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1984).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979).
122. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 11-38, at 511; EISENBERG, supra note 96, at 1.
Professor Kunz has observed that the UCC provisions on good faith serve one or more of the
following functions:
(1) restrict the exercise of one-sided power in a contract, in order to avoid unfair or
unexpected results; (2) restrict the range of possible responses to defective performance
or to an unexpected event, in order to salvage the contractual relationship or preserve the
parties' negotiating positions; (3) impose a duty to mitigate losses, in order to avoid
giving the aggrieved party a windfall beyond the expectations of the contract; and (4)
protect the innocent third party buyer or purchaser against claims of the original owner
and other claimants.
CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, Frontispiece on Good Faith: A Functional Approach Within the UCC,
16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1990).
123. SUMMERS, supra note 118, at 232-42; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205,
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Good Faith in Contract Enforcement
Most states apply good faith requirements to contract enforcement. As
described in the Restatement of Contracts, "It]he obligation of good faith and
fair dealing extends to the assertion, settlement and litigation of contract
claims and defenses." 124 The Restatement offers a number of examples where
the courts have found bad faith in the enforcement of contractual enforcement
terms: conjuring up a pretended dispute; asserting an interpretation contrary
to one's own understanding; falsification of facts; harassing demands for
assurances of performance; rejection of performance for unstated reasons;
willful failure to mitigate damages; and abuse of a power to determine com-
pliance or to terminate the contract.
12 5
SHORTENING ARM'S LENGTH TRANSACTIONS
Having examined the law's dichotomized approach to dealing with con-
tracting parties we can reach a number of summarizing observations. First, the
degree of protection accorded the parties is determined principally by whether
the parties are in a special relationship or at arm's length. Second, the stage
of the contract is the second most significant determinant of contract protec-
tions. Figures 1 and 2 (see Appendix) illustrate the effect of these two vari-
ables. In Figure 1, one can see that the protections provided parties in a spe-
cial relationship extend throughout the contract relationship including its
formation. In contrast, as Figure 2 shows, in arm's length transactions there
are fewer protections, 26 the protections are less extensive, 2 7 and some do not
extend into the formation stage.
28
Figure 3 (see Appendix) depicts the relationship between what conduct
is required and the relationship of the contracting parties. ( In this figure the
required conduct is cumulative: each set of required conduct also includes all
of the sets below it.) It also shows the relative degree of protection these
contractual relationships receive. One should note that there is a considerable
cmt. d (1979).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. e (1979).
125. Id.; See SUMMERS, supra note 118, at 243-52 (discussing many forms of bad faith
contracting).
126. There is usually no requirement of full disclosure in arm's length transactions. See
DOBBS, supra note 7.
127. In confidential relationships the utmost good faith is required whereas in arm's length
transactions only ordinary (either subjective or both subjective and objective) good faith is
required.
128. In arm's length transactions the duty of good faith does not apply to the formation of
a contract. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
Summer, 1994]
15
Adler and Mann: Good Faith: A New Look At An Old Doctrine
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995
AKRON LAW REVIEW
gap between the protection at the arm's length level and the protection at the
special relationship level. We suggest that a number of strategic alliances fall
in this region, but under the law's dichotomized approach are subject only to
the duties of arm's length transactions.
29
Contracting parties, however, have the option of choosing to be gov-
erned by higher duties through contractual provisions of their own devising.
In this section we explore some strategies by which the parties may do so.
Most of these suggestions make use of either or both of the following: (1)
expanding the duty of good faith or (2) specifying the applicable good faith
standards.
Disclaimers
Before suggesting strategies we would voice several words of caution.
First, because the notion of good faith defies precise definition, parties who
build it into contracts to police the terms of an agreement create a certain
degree of uncertainty in their relations. Instead of the parties' knowing where
they stand with respect to their rights and responsibilities, they face less clar-
ity if they have to turn to good faith concepts to resolve contract disputes.13°
Although we see the potential problems associated with relying on good faith
in contracts, we suspect that parties who place great weight on good faith
relationships are probably predisposed to work out problems rather than to
litigate in the first place. Moreover, we do not advocate enhancing the role
of good faith to the point where it constitutes the exclusive policing mecha-
nism in any contract. To the contrary, parties to a contract should always seek,
to the extent possible, to draw precise lines and allocate risks of loss carefully
as a way of avoiding the necessity of turning to good faith concepts to resolve
conflicts. We suggest the use of good faith in order to create an atmosphere
charged with trust and mutual support rather than one in which the parties
129. Or as Cardozo said: "the morals of the marketplace." Meinard v. Salman, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
130. Professor Kunz concludes that this uncertainty may not have a stimulating effect on
the amount of litigation:
[T]he uncertainty in the good faith concept may well be having the opposite effect in the
vast bulk of potential commercial disputes. Except in the tiny percentage of commercial
cases that end up in the court system, parties may well be motivated to act within the
bounds of good faith, in order to avoid having to pay the costs associated with litigating
good faith definitions and applications. As in other portions of the UCC, uncertainty
probably "depolarizes" the disputing parties and brings them back to the middle-to the
negotiating table.
KUNZ, supra note 122, at 1110.
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address disputes by dashing to the written contract and reading every provi-
sion in a way that most permits them to take advantage of each other.
Second, and closely related to the first point, where the parties cannot
resolve a matter by themselves under the principles of good faith and turn to
the judiciary, they may find the outcome unappealing to either party. A third
party's sense of what constitutes "good faith" may not comport with their own
sense.
Third, the party who proposes including expanded good faith language
in a contract must always be concerned about the "hoist with your own petard"
effect of such language. In seeking to guarantee fair dealing in a contract, a
party may focus exclusively on fears of misdealing by the other party and
ignore the possibility that a court might not view the party's dealings as
benignly as he does.
Suggested Strategies
Having considered these and other possible pitfalls in using an enhanced
or specified duty of good faith in contracts, we remain convinced that, used
carefully and realistically, it can play an important role. In particular, a party
facing the following situations should consider including good faith language
in his contract dealings: (1) the other party has substantially greater economic
leverage; (2) the other party's trustworthiness is not easily ascertainable; (3)
it is desirable to set a trusting tone in a long-term contractual relationship with
the other party; (4) it is not possible to spell out important contingencies and
to allocate risks of loss because, for example, of the open-endedness of the
contract or the exigencies of time; or (5) the contract is drafted by the other
party.
In these and other instances where it seems appropriate, we suggest the
following approaches be considered:
Agree to Negotiate in Good Faith
Although neither the Code nor the Restatement explicitly requires the
parties to negotiate in good faith, nothing bars them, at the outset of a nego-
tiation, from agreeing explicitly to negotiate in good faith. At a minimum, this
should mean that both parties intend to reach an agreement, if possible.
Does this mean that both parties agree not to withhold relevant material
facts from one another during the negotiation? It could, but need not. They
should decide explicitly whether good faith will or will not include the disclo-
sure of material facts not otherwise required to be disclosed under existing
law. In some situations, the parties might decide that the "one-shot" nature
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of the deal should not require disclosure beyond what the law currently re-
quires. In others, especially where a long-term relationship is contemplated,
the parties might decide that it would make sense to agree to make relatively
full disclosure.
Ask For Or Offer a Warranty of Full Disclosure
An alternative (or supplement) to agreeing to negotiate in good faith is
for one or both parties to warrant that full disclosure of all material facts has
been made during the negotiations. This would seem particularly useful in a
situation where one party remains puzzled or skeptical about the other party's
motives in entering into the contract. For example, where one party appears
overly eager to buy another party's land, this provision would guarantee that
no hidden value known by the buyer, but not revealed to the seller, prompts
the buyer's interest in the property. Conversely, where one of the parties
appears skeptical about the other party's candor and forthrightness, the
doubted party might suggest including a warranty of full disclosure as a way
of driving home the bargain.
Specify that Good Faith Includes "Fair Dealing" As Well As "Honesty"
For contracts that are covered only by the general provision of the Code
that limits the meaning of "good faith" to "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned," the parties can agree that they intend in their contract
that a broader definition of the term good faith should apply. This could be
either the Code's objective test or the Restatement's, thus imposing a duty of
"fair dealing" on their contract.
Spell Out the Standards of Good Faith That Apply to a Contract
As noted,"' neither the Code nor the Restatement permits the parties to
disclaim good faith. On the other hand, as noted previously, the parties to a
contract are free to spell out the standards by which good faith is to be judged
so long as the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.132 Among the
standards governing good faith the parties might consider are the extent to
which they wish the term to include full disclosure of all relevant material
facts, the extent to which one party may request contract modifications in the
event of unforeseen circumstances not caused by either party, or the extent to
which the parties wish to include "brother's keepers" language that requires
131. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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one to assist the other in the event of unforeseen circumstances not caused
by either party. A careful definition of good faith will clarify expectations
on both sides of a contract and assist any court called upon to interpret a
good faith clause.
Spell Out Risks of Loss Not Subject to "Good Faith" Modification
One way to avoid having a court undermine a clear understanding with
respect to the allocation of risks of loss in a contract is to spell them out. For
example, where a contractor has undertaken an inspection to determine
whether underground rocks might require extra costs to excavate and has
assumed the risk of loss associated with encountering them, the parties should
spell out that the contractor assumes this risk. This would alert a reviewing
court that neither a general good faith clause in a contract nor general good
faith requirements in the law should be invoked to permit a party to avoid his
or her legitimate contractual obligations. On the other hand, if the contractor
ran into an unexpected flooding problem rather than rocks, good faith might
require a modification of the contract's terms.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have suggested that arm's length contracting parties
incorporate and use an invigorated duty of good faith and fair dealing as a
protective device. Of course, such a provision is reciprocal and thus would
apply to both parties. Although a party would especially want to use this
obligation when that party has less bargaining power or has concerns about the
other party's reliability, we believe a party would also be better off using
it even if that party enjoyed superior bargaining power and trusted the
other party. As a general matter, a heightened good faith and fair dealing
obligation in arm's length transactions is prudent and desirable for the
following reasons:
(1) It elevates the morals of the market place.
(2) It protects a party against the unanticipated: that party's bargaining
power may diminish or disappear, or the trustworthy contracting party
may prove to be untrustworthy.
(3) The courts are more and more inclined to impose and enforce the duty
of good faith and fair dealing so a party should consider acting preemp-
tively by making sure that the duty is expressly understood and assumed
by the other party and by having the parties' own agreed upon standards
applied to the duty.
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An earlier draft of the Code's general application section on good faith
had defined the obligation of good faith to include both the subjective and
objective standards. 133 Even more intriguing was the comment to this draft
section: "This Act adopts the principles of those cases which see a commer-
cial contract not as an 'arm's-length' adversary venture, but as a venture of
material interest, when successful, and as involving due regard for commer-
cial decencies when the expected favorable outcome fails.' 3 4
This comment conveys a view that a contract creates a relationship that
would require each party to act with due regard for the interests of both par-
ties. Under current law, when arm's length parties enter into a contract their
obligation to each other moves somewhat closer to those owed by parties in
a confidential or fiduciary relationship. (See Appendix, Figure 3.) By estab-
lishing their own standards by which to measure good faith and fair dealing,
parties can determine how far towards a confidential or fiduciary relationship
they want their contractual venture to go. The contemporary, globally com-
petitive environment has made it clear that contracting parties' survival may
depend upon each other's overall success. This mutuality of interest makes
many contractual relationships truly strategic alliances and we commend our
approach as a specific means to bring about a contractual relationship in which
the parties act with due regard for their mutual interests and thereby enhance
their individual success.
133. U.C.C. § 1-203 (May 1949 Draft).
134. U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (May 1949 Draft), quoted in CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, Limitations
on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L. J. 619, 623 n.21.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1.
Contractual Policing Devices in Special Relationships
Duress
Fraud and Misrepresentation
Unilateral Mistake
Unconscionability
Formation Performance Enforcement
Utmost Good Faith
Full Disclosure
Figure 2.
Contractual Policing Devices in Arm's Length Transactions
Duress
Fraud and Misrepresentation
Unilateral Mistake
Unconscionability
0-
Formation I Performance I Enforcement
Good Faith
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Figure 3.
Graduated Standards of Conduct
Required Conduct
Full understanding
No competition
No conflicts of interest
No secret profits
Utmost good faith
Full disclosure
Fair dealing
(Objective good faith)
Honesty in fact
(Subjective good faith)
No duress
No fraud
No misrepresentation
No unilateral mistake
No unconscionability
Relationship
Fiduciary relationships
-I Confidential relationships
Contracting parties
(Restatement)
Merchants (UCC)
--- Contracting parties (UCC)
- Arm's length negotiation
I
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